We study identification in games with a finite set of pure strategy profiles and multiple equilibria. For concreteness, we focus on simultaneous entry games similar to those discussed by Andrews, Berry and Jia (2004), Ciliberto and Tamer (2006) and Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2007). In these games the presence of multiple equilibria leads to partial identification of the model parameters. The identification regions for these parameters proposed in the related literature, given by the parameter vectors that satisfy a finite number of moment inequalities, are not sharp, as discussed for example by Berry and Tamer (2007). Using the theory of random sets, we show that an identification region based on a larger, yet finite, set of moment inequalities is sharp. While the set of moment inequalities we propose can be much larger than the set of moment inequalities used in the related literature, we show that estimation based on this larger set remains computationally feasible. We use examples analyzed in the literature to illustrate the gains in identification afforded by our method.
of the payoff functions are not identified, and makes the use of estimation techniques like maximum likelihood not applicable.
The literature has taken two main roads to address the existance of multiple equilibria. One is to impose a sufficient number of additional assumptions to guarantee that the payoff parameters are point identified. In a series of papers Bresnahan and Reiss explore entry games between homogeneous firms. They exploit the fact that although the identity of the entrant is not identified, the number of entrants is. Using this observation they show that the parameters of the profit function are identified. Tamer (2003) further investigates the sources of identification in this entry models and shows that a more efficient estimator can be achieved if one estimates the likelihood of each equilibrium to occur. Berry (1992) considers the estimation of entry models for the airline industry. He allows for heterogenous firms. The source of heterogeneity in his model is in the fixed costs of entry that depends on observed firm specific variables as well as on unobserved firm specific shocks. Even though the firms are not homogeneous with respect to their fixed costs, Berry assumes that the firms have an homogenous competition effect. This means that, post entry, each firm cares about the number of rivals it faces and not about their identity. With this assumption the number of firms is still identified. Berry uses this fact and also employs different assumptions on the equilibrium selection mechanism based on sequential move.
More recently, various papers have begun exploring the potential for application of the 'Bounds approach' to market structure models with multiple equilibria. The approach is based on the observation that although the parameters of interest cannot be point identified, they can be partially identified. In this case, one can learn a set of values for the parameters of interest which are consistent with the sampling process and the maintained assumptions. This identification region (Manski (2003) ) is usually characterized by a set of inequality and equality constraints on the parameters of the model. The inequality and equality constraints employed by empirical researchers to date do not yield a sharp identification region, as for example observed by Berry and Tamer (2007) . This means that there is additional information in the model which is not fully exploited, and may allow one to rule out inadmissible values for the model parameters.
Estimation of the sharp identification regions is considered unfeasible because it is believed to involve an infinite dimensional nuisance parameter. The purpose of this paper is to show that for games with a finite set of pure strategy profiles and multiple equilibria, the sharp identification region of the parameter vector characterizing the model can be obtained as the set of vectors that satisfy a finite number of moment inequalities. To illustrate the basic idea of the paper, consider a static entry game of complete information in which each player has a finite number of pure strategies. Suppose that this game is played in many markets, and each market's outcome is observed. These data allow us to consistently estimate the probability that each possible outcome is realized. Hence, if a vector y is a potential outcome of the game, the probability p y = Pr (y is observed) can be consistently estimated from the data. In the presence of multiple equilibria, Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004) observe that an implication of the model is that p y ≤ Pr (y is a possible equilibrium of the game). This is because when y is a possible equilibrium outcome, there can be another outcome y which is also a possible equilibrium of the game, and when both are possible y is selected only part of the time. While p y is consistently estimated from the data, the probability that y is a possible equilibrium depends on the parameters of the model, and therefore the inequality above places restrictions on the values that these parameters can take. Ciliberto and Tamer (2006) point out that additional information can be learned from the model. In particular, p y ≥ Pr (y is the unique equilibrium of the game). This is because y is certainly realized whenever it is the only possible equilibrium, but it can additionally be realized when it belongs to a set of multiple equilibria. The probability that y is the unique equilibrium of the game also depends on the parameters of the model, and hence the additional inequality further restricts the values that these parameters can take.
We show that additional information can be learned from more complicated events. To illustrate this claim, consider the probability that either y or y are realized. This probability equals p y + p y and can be consistently estimated using the data. A similar logic to what we discussed above gives that p y +p y ≤ Pr (y or y are possible equilibria of the game). This inequality further constraints the values that the parameters of interest can take. Additional such inequalities involving combined events of two or more outcomes can be used. Theorem 2.1 applies results of random set theory (Molchanov (2005) ) to characterize the set of inequalities that yields the sharp identification region for the payoff parameters of the game. In particular, the Theorem shows that if Y is the set of all possible equilibrium outcomes of the game, the sharp identification region is obtained by taking the parameter values that satisfy p K ≤ Pr (one of the outcomes in K is a possible equilibrium of the game)
for each K ⊂ Y, where p K is the sum of p y over all y ∈ K. In principle, this line of argument implies that there are 2 card(Y) inequalities to check, where card (Y) is the cardinality of Y. In some applications this number of inequalities, although finite, can be quite large, rendering estimation of the sharp identification infeasible in practice. In most applications, however, it is possible to show that the number of inequalities to verify can be substantially reduced. Moreover, the computational burden associated with checking the set of inequalities we derive is similar to that implied by methods that do not yield a sharp identification region (e.g., Ciliberto and Tamer (2006) ).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the relevant concepts from the theory of random sets and uses these concepts to construct the sharp identification region through a finite set of moment equalities and inequalities. Sections 2.1-2.2 illustrate the identification gains afforded by our method through two simple examples previously considered in the literature. Section 3 gives further insights into which inequalities one needs to use in order to get the sharp identification region.
An empirical application is in progress.
A section of concluding remarks will be added.
Sharp Identification Regions Based on the Capacity Functional
Our main interest is in games of complete information in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies. A key example is the simultaneous move, complete information, static game of entry, in which each player can choose between two actions: "enter" or "not enter." Partial identification of this model is studied by Ciliberto and Tamer (2004, CT henceforth) and Andrews, Berry, and Jia
We let s i = (s 1i , . . . , s Ji ) denote the vector of players' strategies in market i = 1, . . . , n. The vector s i belongs to the set S of pure strategy profiles. We denote by π ji (s ji , s −ji , x ji , ε ji , θ) the profit function for firm j in market i, where, s −ji is the vector of player j's opponents' strategies, x ji ∈ X is a vector of observable profit shifters, ε ji is a profit shifter observed by the players but unobserved by the econometrician, and θ ∈ Θ ⊂ p is a vector of parameters to be estimated, with Θ the parameter space. The number of players is J and the number of markets is n. For market i, the observed matrix of profit shifters is X i , which is comprised of the non-redundant elements of x ji , j = 1, . . . , J. The econometrician observes a vector of equilibrium outcomes
In what follows, we restrict our attention to games that satisfy the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 The set S of pure strategy profiles and the set Y of potential equilibrium outcomes observable by the econometrician are finite. The number of possible strategies for player j is card (S j ) , j = 1, . . . , J, where card (·) denotes the cardinality of a set. The strategy profiles s i determine the outcomes y i observable by the econometrician through a measurable mapping g : S → Y. This mapping is known by the econometrician. The parametric form of the profit functions π ji (s ji , s −ji , x ji , ε ji , θ) , j = 1, . . . , J, i = 1, . . . , n, is known. These functions are measurable in all their arguments.
Assumption 2 The econometrician observes a random sample (y i , X i ) n i=1 from a large cross section of markets drawn from a population distribution that satisfies Assumption 1. The unobserved random vector ε i is continuously distributed on J independently of X i with a joint distribution function F that is known up to a finite dimensional parameter that is part of θ.
Assumption 1 assures that there is a finite set of strategies for each player, and a finite set of possible outcomes observable by the econometrician. In many static games of entry as those analyzed by CT and ABJ, players' actions and the outcomes observable by the econometrician conincide.
Assumption 2 allows us to identify P {y ∈ K| X} for any set K ⊂ Y, the distribution of observed equilibrium outcomes in the population. Since our focus in this note is identification, we treat identified distributions as population distributions. Statistical considerations will be addressed at a later stage.
We denote by (Ω, A, P) a probability space on which (y, s, X, ε) are defined. We say that
The Random Set of Equilibrium Outcomes Generated by Pure Strategies
We assume that players in each market follow Nash behavior. The example in Section 2.2 below shows that our results easily extend to a weaker equilibrium concept where players are only k-level rational, as in Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2007) . A strategy profile s i ∈ S is a pure strategy Nash
Using this inequality, and omitting the subscript indexing the market, for a given X we define the following θ-dependent set:
For a given value of θ, this is the set of outcomes generated by pure strategies Nash equilibria.
Clearly this set depends on X, but for ease of notation we write Z θ and omit the explicit reference to X. Given Assumption 1, Z θ is a random closed set in Y (Molchanov (2005)).
Definition 1 Denoting by C the collection of all non-empty closed subsets of Y, a map Z θ : Ω → C is called a random closed set (RCS), also known as a closed set valued random variable, if for
The implications of this measurability condition can be better understood in the context of the games we consider observing the following. For given y ∈ Y, X ∈ X , and parameter θ ∈ Θ, the following event
is comprised of the set of vectors ε for which there exists a strategy profile s ∈ S which is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium determining the outcome y. By the same logic, for any C ⊂ Y, X ∈ X , we have
Hence, for given X ∈ X ,
The Random Set of Equilibrium Outcomes Generated by Mixed Strategies
Let σ j : S j → [0, 1] be the mixed strategy for player j that assigns to each pure strategy s j ∈ S j a probability σ j (s j ) ≥ 0 that it is played, with
denote the mixed extension of S j . Then the mixed strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ J ) consistutes a Nash equilibrium if
Using this inequality, and omitting the subscript indexing the market, we define the following θ-dependent set:
, and
For a given value of θ, this is the set of outcomes generated by mixed strategies Nash equilibria.
The Capacity Functional and the Sharpness Result
If the model is correctly specified, the observed outcomes y are consistent with Nash behavior.
Hence there exists at least one θ ∈ Θ such that y(ω) ∈ Z θ (ω) P − a.s. In this case one says that y is a selection of Z θ , see Molchanov (2005, Chapter 1): For the case that there are covariates X, it is possible to condition in (2.4) upon these variables.
Assume first that X is discrete with possible realizations
. This is the case if and only if
If X is not necessarily discrete, then (2.4) implies (2.5) by observing that 1 y∈K ≤ 1 Z θ ∩K =∅ almost surely and taking the conditional expectation with respect to X, whereas (2.5) leads to (2.4) by the Law of Iterated Expectations.
Hence, we define the identified set of parameters θ as (2.6)
In the special case where there is no multiple equilibria and Z θ (ω) = {ζ (ω)} is a singleton for all ω ∈ Ω, (2.5) is satisfied if and only if
which means that y and ζ share the same distribution. On the other hand, suppose that Ω =
outcome implied by the unique Nash equilibrium on Ω 1 . If Z θ (ω) is a set containing more than one element for ω ∈ Ω 2 , that is, if there are multiple Nash equilibrium outcomes on the set Ω 2 , then for ω ∈ Ω 2 any ζ (ω) ∈ Z θ (ω) selects a possible Nash equilibrium outcome. Hence, y (ω) ∈ Z θ (ω) P − a.s. if and only if there exists a selection ζ (ω) ∈ Z θ (ω) P − a.s. whose distribution can be indexed by θ and such that
For comparison purposes, we introduce the definition of the identified sets given by ABJ and CT respectively:
where Z θ is defined as in equation (2.2) = {ε : C is the set of multiple equilibrium outcomes given X and θ} , where t ∈ Y is an equilibrium outcome, and C ⊂ Y is a set of cardinality greater than one. For
. . , card (Y) be a random variable denoting which of the possible strategy profiles is the equilibrium selected in the region of multiplicity, the first, second,... (proper) selection mechanism ψ (...) such that the induced probability distribution P { y| X; θ, ψ} matches the choice probabilities P {y| X} for all X almost everywhere.
So, the presence of multiple equilibria introduces nuisance parameters that are not specified and hence makes it harder to identify the parameter θ."
Berry and Tamer (2004) by exploiting the fact that the selection mechanism ψ is a probability and hence bounded between zero and one. Although this approach does not provide a sharp set, it is practically attractive."
The following theorem establishes that Θ I is the sharp set described by Berry and Tamer (2007) .
Because the set Y is discrete, the collection of compact sets K ⊂ Y is of cardinality at most 2 card(Y) , where card (Y) denotes the cardinality of the set Y. Hence the set Θ I is given by the collection of vectors θ ∈ Θ that satisfy a finite number of moment inequalities X − a.s., and therefore can be estimated using methods for set estimation with moment inequalities.
Theorem 2.1 Assume that the equilibrium played in each market is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, that Assumptions 1-2 are satisfied, and that no other information is available. Then
Proof. Takeθ ∈ Θ BT I . Then ∃d with distributionψ which is a proper selection mechanism such that P { y ∈ K| X} = P { ζ ∈ K| X} X − a.s. for all compact sets K ⊂ Y, where for each X, t, C, ζ (ω) = t is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome if ω : ε (ω) ∈ U X,θ t , and ζ (ω) ∈ C is the equilibrium outcome selected byd, i.e., according to the selection mechanismψ, if ω : ε (ω) ∈ M X,θ C . This implies that ζ (ω) ∈ Zθ (ω) P − a.s., and by equation (2.5)
Conversely, take θ ∈ Θ I . Then there exists a selection ζ (ω) ∈ Z θ (ω) P−a.s. whose distribution can be indexed by θ and such that P {y ∈ K| X} = P {ζ ∈ K| X} X − a.s. for all compact sets
, ζ (ω) = t is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome.
If ω : ε (ω) ∈ M X,θ C , ζ (ω) ∈ C and for each j = 1, . . . , card (Y) one can letd (ω) = j if ζ (ω) is the j−th equilibrium outcome. This is a proper equilibrium selection mechanism. Hence, θ ∈ Θ BT I .
Computational Issues
The set Θ I is defined by 2 card(Y) inequalities which have to hold X − a.s. This number can be, in practice, very large. Is the computation of Θ I feasible? If indeed 2 card(Y) inequalities needed to be verified, the problem would become computationally infeasible reasonably quickly. For example, with two actions for each player and observable outcomes equal to players' actions, one would need to consider 256 market structures with three players, and 65,536 market structures with four players.
Fortunately, in many cases there is no need to verify the complete set of 2 card(Y) inequalities. In particular, if K 1 and K 2 are two subsets of Y such that
= ∅| X} does not add any information beyond that provided by the inequalities P {y ∈ K 1 | X} ≤ P { Z θ ∩ K 1 = ∅| X} and P {y ∈ K 2 | X} ≤ P {Z θ ∩ K 2 = ∅| X}. 2 Therefore, prior knowledge of some properties of the game can be very helpful in eliminating unnecessary inequalities. As a leading example of this kind of reduction in the number of inequalities to be verified, one can think of entry games considered by Bresnahan and
Reiss where the number of players is identified but the support of X is not rich enough to give point identification of the parameters of interest. The game we describe in the following section is another example for the possible elimination of unnecessary inequlities. In this example the sharp identification region that we give is based on 19 inequalities and 2 equalities, whereas the identification region obtained following CT's insight is based on 12 inequalities and 2 equalities. Having said this, we acknowledge that the method described here may be, for some models, computationaly more intensive than existing methods. However, the benefits in terms of identification coming from considering these additional inequalities may be substaintial.
An Example with Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria: Entry Game With 2 Types of Players
Consider a game where in each market there are four potential entrants, two of each type, whose behavior is Nash. The two types differ from each other by their payoff function. This model is an extenstion of the seminal papers by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991 ). An empirical application of a version of this model appears in Cilberto and Tamer (2004) . We adopt the version of this model described in Berry and Tamer (2007, pages 84-85) , and for illustration purposes we simplify it by omitting the observable profit shifters x and by setting to zero the constant in the profit function.
Let s jk ∈ {0, 1} be the strategy of firm j = 1, 2 of type k = 1, 2. Entry is denoted by s jk = 1, with s jk = 0 denoting staying out. Let y 1 = s 11 + s 21 denote the number of rivals of type 1 and y 2 = s 12 + s 22 the number of rivals of type 2 that a firm faces so that y k ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Players j = 1, 2 of type 1 and type 2 have respectively the following profit functions:
where (ε 1 , ε 2 ) are the random profit shocks (e.g. fixed costs) for type 1 and type 2 respectively.
We assume that θ 11 , θ 21 and θ 22 are strictly negative and that θ 22 > θ 21 . This means that a type 2 firm is worried more about rivals of type 1 than of rivals of its own type. Since firms of a given type are indistinguishable to the econometrician, the observable outcome is the numbers of firms of each type which enter the market. Hence there are 9 possible outcomes to this game: and Reiss' model, the number of entrants is not identified. Moreover, the game exhibits quite a 'rich' multiplicity of equilibria, an issue that we revisit below.
We use this example to illustrate our methodology. We first define the specific form taken by the set Z θ introduced above:
Observe that the set Y has cardinality 9. This implies that in principle there are 2 9 inequality restrictions to consider, corresponding to each compact subset K ⊂ Y. Examples of such sets K are each of the basic outcomes comprising Y, all possible pairs of outcomes (e.g., {(0, 0) ; (0, 1)} , {(0, 0) ; (1, 0)} , . . .), all possible triplets of outcomes, etc. Examples of the inequalities in equation (2.5) follow:
After choosing values for the probabilities of the outcomes in Y (e.g Pr (y = (0, 0)) etc.), we computed the identification region for (θ 11 , θ 21 , θ 22 ) under ABJ's constraints (the red region), under CT's constraints (the blue region) and under our constraints which give the sharp bound (the light blue region). Figure 2 describes the results.
An Example with Level-1 Rationality
While in the main body of this note we focus on economic models of games in which Nash Equilibrium is the solution concept employed, our contribution easily extends to models in which players are only assumed to be level-k rational, or to play rationalizable strategies. We exemplify this extension by looking at a simple simultaneous move, complete information, two players static game of entry in which players are only assumed to be level-1 rational. This game was first analyzed in the econometrics literature by Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2007, AT henceforth). The assumption of level-1 rationality means that each player will only play strategies that are a best response to one of the strategies that her opponent can play.
In this example, the econometrician observes players' actions, and therefore y = s. We assume that each player has a profit function that depends on the action of her opponent, and ignore covariates for ease of exposition. We let
where y i ∈ {0, 1} is player i s strategy, π i is player i s profit, ε i is a profit shifter unobserved by the econometrician, and θ i is assumed to be negative (monopoly profits are higher than duopoly profits), i = 1, 2. Figure 3 depicts the observable implications of this model under level-1 rationality, that is, the market outcomes that are level-1 rational given that ε 1 , ε 2 are in a specified range.
Suppose for simplicity that the joint distribution of ε 1 , ε 2 is completly known. Due to the presence of multiple equilibria, the parameters θ 1 , θ 2 are not point identified. AT observe that a set of implications of the model, which restrict the possible values that θ 1 , θ 2 can take, is given by the following inequalities:
Our claim is that there is additional identifying power in looking at the probability of joint events.
For example, if we look at the probability that the market outcome is either (0, 0) or (1, 0) , we obtain:
This condition has identifying power on top of (2.12)-(2.15). In fact, assume for simplicity that Figure 4 gives the identification region for (θ 1 , θ 2 ) using inequalities (2.12)-(2.15) only (black region), and using the additional inequalities which look at pairs of events (red region; triplets of events do not have additional identifying power because their complements are single events, which are already taken into account through restrictions (2.12)-(2.15)). Theorem 2.1 implies that the identification region we construct using these additional inequalities is sharp, in the sense that it exhausts all the available information given the data and the maintained assumptions.
In many cases it is difficult to check if (2.5) holds for all compact sets K. The following propositions, in which we omit the conditioning on X, suggest a reduction of the family of possible sets K that are needed to ensure that y is a selection Z θ and identify cases in which the additional inequalities we propose are guaranteed to have identifying power. Observe that equation (2.5) trivially holds for K = Y, and therefore one needs to check it only for all K ⊂ Y of cardinality strictly less than the cardinality of Y, i.e. for K being a strict subset of Y.
Theorem 3.1 Consider a partition of Ω into sets Ω 1 , . . . , Ω M of positive probability. Let Y i
Then it suffices to check (2.5) only for all subsets K such that there is i = 1, . . . , M for which K ⊂ Y i .
since Z θ cannot hit both K i and K j simultaneously in view of the disjointedness assumption.
While the proof of Theorem 3.1 is simple, this result is conceptually and practically important. A leading application of this Theorem is to entry games in which the number of entrants is identified, as in the Bresnahan and Reiss model. To illustrate the practical importance of the Theorem, consider a game with 4 players and homogeneous competition effects (i.e., each firm's profit depends on the number of rivals it faces post-entry and not on their identity). In such a model, 2 card(Y) = 65, 536.
But Theorem 3.1 implies that only 96 inequalities and 2 equalities need to be checked.
A simple Corollary of Theorem 3.1 is the following:
, and assume that Y 1 ∩ Y 2 = ∅ and that card (Y 2 ) ≤ 2.
Then inequalities (2.5) hold if
An implication of this Corollary is that in the static entry game with two players and pure strategy Nash equilibrium as a solution concept, the identification regions proposed by ABJ and CT coincide, and are sharp. In this example, Y 1 = {(0, 0) , (1, 1)} , Y 2 = {(0, 1) , (1, 0)} , and
However, in general it is very restrictive to assume that the cardinality of Y 2 from Corollary 3.2 is at most 2. Indeed it means that if Z θ has cardinality more than one, then it is deterministic and equals Y 2 . The following result shows that in general (for discrete Y) the full system of constraints (2.5) is sharper than the constraints obtained by restricting attention to K being singletons, as it is done by ABJ.
Theorem 3.3 Assume that there exists θ ∈ Θ such that the expected cardinality of Z θ is strictly greater than one, and such that P {ω : {t 1 , t 2 } ∩ Z θ (ω) = ∅} < 1 for all t 1 , t 2 ∈ Y. Then there exists a random vector ζ which satisfies inequalities (3.1) but is not a selection of Z θ .
Proof. For each finite set
Since the expected cardinality of Z θ is more than one, there exist t 1 , t 2 ∈ Y such that I(t 1 , t 2 ) > 0.
Assume that I(t 1 ) + I(t 2 ) ≥ 1. Then choose a random element ζ which takes values t 1 and t 2 with probabilities that sum to one and are dominated by I(t 1 ) and I(t 2 ) respectively. Then (2.5) holds for all singletons K, while if K = {t 1 , t 2 }, then
cannot be smaller than P {{t 1 , t 2 } ∩ Z θ (ω) = ∅}, since the latter is less than one by assumption.
Assume that I(t 1 ) + I(t 2 ) < 1. Then construct a random element ζ that takes values t 1 and t 2 with probabilities I(t 1 ) and I(t 2 ) and some values t outside of {t 1 , t 2 } with probabilities dominated by I(t) for the chosen t. This is possible, since the total sum of I(t) over t ∈ Y equals the expected cardinality of Z θ and so is at least one. Then
This result shows that the extra inequalities matter in general, compared to those used by ABJ. However, CT strengthen the use of the singleton-based inequalities through an insight that corresponds to the observation that
In order to show that the additional inequalities that we propose can give an identification region which is a proper subset of the one introduced by CT, we introduce some notation. Given t ∈ Y, K ⊂ Y, let J(t) = P{Z = {t}}
For simplicity write I(t) instead of I({t}) and I(t 1 , t 2 ) instead of I({t 1 , t 2 }) and the same for the capacity functional T . Note that
J(t) ≤ I(t) ≤ T (t) .
In this notation the inequalities used by CT can be expressed as J(t) ≤ P{y = t} ≤ I(t) .
for all t ∈ Y.
Theorem 3.4 Assume that there exists θ ∈ Θ such that Z θ is nonempty almost surely, and there exist t 1 , t 2 ∈ Y such that (3.3) I(t 1 , t 2 ) > 0 and (3.4) P{card(Z θ ) > 1} > I(t 1 ) + I(t 2 ) − J(t 1 ) − J(t 2 ) > 0 .
Then there exists a random vector ζ which satisfies equation (3.2) but is not a selection of Z θ .
Proof. We use notation from the proof of Theorem 3.3. Denote κ Z θ = card(Z θ ). Note that Take t 1 , t 2 to satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 3.4. If I(t 1 ) + I(t 2 ) ≥ 1, then define ζ which takes values t = t 1 , t 2 with probabilities J(t) for some fixed λ ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, assume that ζ takes values t 1 and t 2 with the probabilities p t 1 = J(t 1 ) + δ t 1 and p t 2 = J(t 2 ) + δ t 2 dominated by I(t 1 ) and I(t 2 ) respectively. In order to obtain a valid probability distribution we have to ensure that t∈Y J(t) + δ t 1 + δ t 2 = 1 , which is possible, since the left-hand side is lesss than 1 for δ t 1 = δ t 2 = 0 since κ Z θ > 1 with positive probability, and the left-hand side is greater than or equal to 1 for δ t 1 = I(t 1 ) − J(t 1 ) and δ t 2 = I(t 2 ) − J(t 2 ). Now (3.5) implies that p t 1 + p t 2 = J(t 1 ) + J(t 2 ) + P{κ Z θ > 1} .
By (3.4), the right-hand side is strictly greater than I(t 1 ) + I(t 2 ), which is not less than T (t 1 , t 2 ) = P{{t 1 , t 2 } ∩ Z = ∅} by the subadditivity of probability. Thus, P{ζ ∈ K} is not dominated by T (K) for K = {t 1 , t 2 }, i.e. ζ is not a selection of Z θ .
Assume that I(t 1 ) + I(t 2 ) < 1. Then construct a random element ζ that takes values t 1 and t 2 with probabilities p t 1 = I(t 1 ) and p t 2 = I(t 2 ) and some values t outside of {t 1 , t 2 } with probabilities p t = λI(t)+(1−λ)J(t) for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Again, these values constitute a probability distribution, since t p t equals t I(t) > 1 if λ = 1, while λ = 0 yields that t p t = t J(t)+I(t 1 )−J(t 1 )+I(t 2 )−J(t 2 ) = 1−(P{κ Z θ > 1}−I(t 1 )−I(t 2 )+J(t 1 )+J(t 2 )) < 1 by (3.4). Finally, P{ζ ∈ {t 1 , t 2 }} = p t 1 + p t 2 = I(t 1 ) + I(t 2 ) while (3.3) yields that T (t 1 , t 2 ) = P{{t 1 , t 2 } ∩ Z = ∅} = I(t 1 ) + I(t 2 ) − I(t 1 , t 2 ) < I(t 1 ) + I(t 2 ) .
Thus, P{ζ ∈ K} is not dominated by T (K) for K = {t 1 , t 2 }, i.e. in this case it is also possible to construct a random element that satisfies (3.2), but fails to be a selection of Z θ . Review of Economic Studies, 70, 147-165.
